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An important dialogue between theorists and experimentalists over the past few decades has raised
the study of the interaction of psychological and economic incentives from academic curiosity to a
bona fide academic field.  One recent area of study within this genre that has sparked interest and debate
revolves around the “hidden costs” of conditional incentives.  This study overlays randomization on
a naturally-occurring environment in a series of temporally-linked field experiments to advance our
understanding of the economics of charity and test if such “costs” exist in the field.  This approach
permits us to examine why people initially give to charities, and what factors keep them committed
to the cause.  Several key findings emerge.  First, there are hidden benefits of conditional incentives
that would have gone undetected had we maintained a static theory and an experimental design that
focused on short run substitution effects rather than dynamic interactions.  Second, we can reject the
pure altruism model of giving.  Third, we find that public good provision is maximized in both the





























I.  Introduction 
According to Greek mythology, mankind’s first philanthropist was the Titan, 
Prometheus, who gave fire to mortal man.  Since Prometheus’ initial act of charity, providing 
assistance to others has become a cornerstone of many cultures and belief systems.
1   Despite the 
historical link with religious activity or duty, the role of charitable fund-raising and the number 
of organizations involved in such activities has been expanding rapidly.
2  In the United States 
alone, there are now more than 1.5 million registered non-profit organizations and nearly 90 
percent of all American families contribute to charity. 
While fund-raisers have developed a variety of strategies to achieve specific funding 
targets, such strategies frequently rely upon rules of thumb rather than hard scientific evidence 
on what induces donors to give.  For example, a popular belief amongst fund-raisers is that 
potential donors are more generous when gifts are included with solicitation requests.  While 
there is ample empirical evidence that unconditional gifts enhance fund-raising success (see, e.g., 
Alpizar et al. 2008; Edlund et al. 2007; Falk 2007; Regan 1971; Whatley et al. 1999), there are 
numerous other ways charities organize gift exchange in field settings – i.e., making gifts 
conditional and varying the minimum donation required to obtain such gifts.   
Viewed through the lens of behavioral economics, the use of conditional gifts is a puzzle.  
Within the context of principal-agent games, such incentives have been shown to influence 
behavioral in an unexpected manner – the use of explicit threats to sanction shirking backfires 
                                                 
1 For example, the concept of giving (zakat) is among five duties incumbent upon every Muslim.  Similar notions of 
giving are fundamental to other religions such as Judaism (tsedakah), Buddhism (dana), and Christianity (tithing) 
and appear as central themes in writings such as Cicero’s On Moral Obligations or Alexander Pope’s “An Essay on 
Man” that cross generations and cultures.   
2 Starting in the mid-1800s, non-profit organizations introduced fund-raising techniques that targeted individual 
donors for financial assistance.  Perhaps spurred by the desires of entrepreneurs such as Andrew Carnegie, Edsel 
Ford, and John D. Rockefeller, many of these approaches were designed to assure donors that their funds would be 
used to further the development of deserving individuals.  For a more detailed history of charity and philanthropy, 
we refer the interested reader to Giving: Charity and Philanthropy in History, by Robert H. Bremmer.   2 
 
and serves to crowd out motivation (see, e.g., Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Fehr and List, 2004; Fehr 
and Rockenbach, 2003; Sliwka, 2007).  Accordingly, the use of conditional incentives (control) 
entails “hidden” costs that escape our attention if reasoning is based on models that assume 
individuals are exclusively self-interested (Fehr and List, 2004).  Despite this evidence, whether 
and how reciprocity and control influence charitable donations is an important open issue.   
In this study, we present an empirical approach that is composed of a set of field 
treatments that parallel the important economic features of the environments in previous studies 
examining the costs of control.  To do so, we organize a series of capital campaigns for the 
Center for Natural Hazards Research at East Carolina University.  Importantly, we use natural 
incentives to change exogenously the solicitees’ action space.
3  In one set of treatments, 
solicitees are provided an unconditional small or large gift.  In another set of treatments, the most 
opportunistic actions are ruled out by making the gifts conditional—i.e., the solicitee must 
contribute a positive dollar amount to obtain the small or large gift.  The final set of treatments 
restricts the choice set even further by enforcing greater control over the donor—the donor 
receives the small (large) gift only if she contributes at least to the level of a certain price point 
($1 ($25)), the approximate retail value of the gift.  In this way, if solicitor trust is a 
characteristic rewarded by solicitees, then the control evoked in the final set of treatments via 
introduction of the price point might crowd out donations.   
  We observe several interesting data patterns.  First, unconditional gifts enhance fund-
raising success.  Relative to individuals approached in the baseline treatment, solicitees 
approached in our unconditional large gift treatment are nearly twice as likely to contribute 
(36.8% versus 21.3%) and, on average, donate more than twice as much ($4.48 versus $1.90) to 
                                                 
3 In this regard, our work shares similarity with Landry et al. (2011) who explore the effect of conditional and 
unconditional gifts on the productivity of solicitors raising money for the Hazard Center.   3 
 
the Hazard Center.  Second, both average contributions per contact and participation rates are 
reduced when we introduce conditionality.  For example, average contributions in our no price 
point treatment are approximately fifty percent lower than those observed in our unconditional 
large gift treatment.  Moreover, both rates of giving and average donations per contact are 
decreasing in the contribution level (price point) required to obtain the large gift.   These results 
are consonant with our theoretical model.  
  Third, we observe an increased propensity for donors in our conditional gift treatments to 
pool at the minimum contribution level required to obtain the gift.  Whereas 2.04 percent of all 
households approached contribute $1.00 in our unconditional small gift treatment, the percentage 
of households that contribute this amount in the corresponding price point treatment increases 
nearly six-fold.  We observe similar data patterns in our large gift treatments – the percentage of 
households contributing $25 nearly triples when we move from the unconditional to the price 
point treatment. 
  Finally, net public good provision per household – average contributions less the costs of 
purchasing the gifts – is increasing in the price point.  In fact, gross proceeds in both the 
unconditional and no price point large gift treatments were insufficient to cover our costs of 
purchasing the large gift.  Net revenues per contact in these treatments are thus significantly 
lower than that observed in both the baseline and price point large gift treatments.  Hence, our 
data suggest that in the short-run a charity is better off providing gifts conditionally to screen 
non-reciprocal types for whom gift exchange is a net loser.   
However, as conditional gifts serve to crowd out donors, it is not clear whether 
conditionality is an optimal long-run strategy.  Since households in our unconditional large gift 
treatment were approximately 74.4 percent more likely to give than counterparts approached in 4 
 
the corresponding price point treatment, it is plausible that unconditional gifts enhance 
profitability in the long-run.  To better ascertain long-run impacts, we returned to the field and 
implemented a second door-to-door fund-raising experiment.   
In designing the second field experiment, we made use of detailed information on 
whether and how households were previously approached.  Two distinct household types – (i) 
those who contributed in experiment I (warm-list households) and (ii) those who have never 
contributed to the Hazard Center (cold-list households) – were randomly approached and asked 
to contribute using a simple ask strategy.  As small gifts had no discernable impact on outcomes 
in experiment I, we restrict the sample of warm-list households to those previously approached 
in either the baseline or one of the three large-gift treatments.   
Results from the second experiment highlight two main findings.  First, feelings of 
reciprocity – as triggered by the receipt of an unconditional gift – wane over time.  Households 
initially attracted by an unconditional gift are approximately 60.2 percent less likely to contribute 
in our follow-up experiment and provide average gifts that are approximately 63 percent lower 
than counterparts initially attracted by a conditional gift.  This suggests that the conditionality 
served as an effective screen of those who were truly interested in giving to our charity.  Second, 
households initially attracted via a conditional gift are significantly more likely to contribute and 
provide larger average gifts than counterparts who initially gave in the baseline.  Taken jointly, 
our data therefore suggest that conditional gift exchange proves a superior fund-raising strategy 
in both the short- and the long-run.
4  
Our results therefore can be interpreted as speaking to several distinct literatures.  For the 
reciprocity literature, our results suggest that gift exchange is important, but that it is limited to 
                                                 
4 This result is consonant with Landry et al. (2011) who find that the use of conditional rewards to incent solicitors is 
a profit enhancing wage structure.   5 
 
the immediate source of kindness; that is, all effects of gift exchange are contemporaneous.  
Speaking to the fundraising literature, we can reject the pure altruism model and instead find 
evidence in favor of the signaling and warm glow models (Vesterlund, 2003; Andreoni, 2006; 
List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002).  Further, our results shed light on the puzzle of why some 
charities use conditional gifts whereas others choose unconditional gifts.  For behavioral 
economics, we find new evidence of the hidden benefits of control:  whereas the benefits arise 
because conditionality is an effective technology to screen donors, such effects would have been 
missed had we followed the standard approach of using a static model and an experimental 
design that focused on measuring short run substitution effects.   
II. Theoretical Model 
We provide a simple model to focus our attention on the most important determinants of 
giving. Our framework augments Andreoni’s (1989, 1990) impure altruism model to allow for 
reciprocal preferences over gifts provided either conditionally or unconditionally.  We consider 
an agent i who receives utility from consuming a numeraire good, i y , a public good 
provided at level G , and (possibly) from their contribution to the public good b. Receiving a 
gift generates some consumption utility,  () i vg, where g measures the perceived cost of the gift 
to the charity and  (0) 0 i v  .  Receiving a gift may also trigger reciprocity captured by an 
additional utility component,  (, )  ii rb g.  Feelings of reciprocity are assumed to depend both on 
the consumption value of the gift and its perceived generosity – represented by a parameter 
[0,1]   .
5  Throughout, we assume that  1    for a gift provided unconditionally and that   is 
                                                 
5  That is, if the gift is provided conditionally – i.e., linked to some minimum contribution level – rather than 
unconditionally, the perceived generosity is reduced.  Intuitively, this assumption captures the hidden costs of 
control noted in the earlier literature (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Sliwka, 2007). 6 
 
reduced if the gift is conditional on specific requirements.   
Assuming that utility is additively separable in these different components, agent i’s 
utility facing a budget constraint  ii i ybw     and receiving a gift g with conditionality factor 
  is defined as:  
(,,) () ( ) () (, )          ii i i i ii i ii ii Ubg w b vg hb B fb rb g 
where  ij ji B b    .  We assume that  ()  i h ,  ()  i f , and     i r  are each increasing and concave 
in b.  Finally, for a given donation size, we assume that marginal benefit from reciprocity is 











ri .  As solicitees in many naturally-occuring settings are able to refuse an offered 
gift, we define an indicator variable as  1 i a   if agent i “accepts” the gift and  0 i a   if the agent 
instead “refuses” the gift.
6  For simplicity, we thus specify the donor’s utility function as,  
     ,   , ,                                                      ,       (1) 
i.e., we assume that rejecting and not receiving a gift are viewed by the donor as equivalent 
outcomes. 
  The agent maximizes (1) by choosing  i b  and, if possible,  {0,1} i a  . The first order 
condition for agent i's utility maximization problem is given by: 
(,,,) 1 ' () ' () (, ) 0 

    

ii
ii i i i ii
i
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   (2) 
                                                 
6 Note that this assumption is different from much of the literature on gift-exchange and may not hold for mail 
solicitations where donors would incur added costs to return the gift to the charity.  We assume that if a donor 
rejects a gift, he receives the same utility as in a VCM setting. One could imagine that the act of offering a gift itself 
might lead to reciprocal behavior by a potential donor. Our predictions of the model therefore give a conservative 
estimate of the effect of gifts on donation decisions. 7 
 
and holds with equality if  0 i b  .  This leads to an optimal contribution level denoted by 
opt(,, ) i ba g  .  Importantly, condition (2) implicitly shows the extent to which the agent 
reciprocates gifts:  
22
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   (3) 
Intuitively, the effect of (accepted) gifts on contribution levels is increasing in the perceived 
generosity of the gift,  . 
Contribution Levels and Unconditional Gift Exchange 
We can now apply these preliminaries to examine how the way in which a charity elects 
to implement gift exchange influences donor behavior.  From condition (3), we have that 
contributions are increasing in the size of an accepted gift for any agent with reciprocal 
preferences.  Yet it need not be the case that all agents have reciprocal preferences and/or accept 
available gifts.  However, in such instances, contribution decisions coincide with the voluntary 
contributions mechanism (VCM).  We can summarize these results as follows: 
Proposition 1. Provided at least some subset of agents has reciprocal preferences, the 
introduction of an unconditional gift unambiguously increases both the number of agents 
who contribute and average contribution levels.  
 
Intuitively, provided agents can refuse an unconditional gift (UG), they cannot be made worse 
off than if the charity were to simply ask for a voluntary contribution.  However, individuals with 
reciprocal preferences that accept an unconditional gift increase contributions relative to this 
baseline case.  Thus, we would expect both higher participation rates and average contributions 
when a charity offers perspective donors an unconditional gift.   
Before proceeding it is worth noting that Proposition 1 is at odds with the pure altruism 
model.  Under this model, the sole impetus for donations is a concern for the well-being of others 8 
 
and aggregate public good provision.  Hence, ulterior motives – i.e., reciprocity – should have no 
impact on donor behavior.  As the receipt of unconditional gifts is delinked from contribution 
decisions, the pure altruism model would thus predict that unconditional gifts have no impact 
along either the intensive or extensive margins.          
Contribution Levels and Conditional Gift Exchange 
We distinguish between two different versions of conditional gifts (CG).  In the first (or 
weak) version of conditionality, the gift is granted if the agent contributes any positive amount.  
The second version imposes a stronger constraint on the agent – the gift is only granted should 
they contribute more than a specified minimum amount, i.e. 
min 0 i bb  .  In our model we 
assume that introducing stricter conditionality reduces the perceived generosity of the gift and 
thereby lowers  .  That is we assume that 
CG UG    , where 
CG   is decreasing in the required 
threshold 
min b .  Hence, in the limit as μ→0, both participation rates and average contribution 
levels will converge towards those observed in an equivalent VCM.
7   
Unfortunately, the effect of changing the required minimum donation level is less clear.  
While an increase in 
min b  serves to crowd reciprocity and therefore lowers the contributions of 
agents for whom 
opt CG min (1, , )   i bg b ,  it may also serve to crowd in contributions via a 
consumption effect.  That is, agents who contribute exactly the minimum level 
min b  may increase 
their contributions so that they remain eligible to receive the gift.  Importantly, however, all such 
agents will contribute 
min b  to “purchase” the conditional gift and we would thus expect to 
observe pooling at the required threshold.   
                                                 
7 Of course, if one were to allow negative values for μ than it would be possible to observe lower participation rates 
and average contributions than in a VCM.   9 
 
Provided that demand for the gift is well-behaved, the number of agents that are willing 
to “purchase” the gift should be strictly decreasing in the threshold contribution level, 
min b .  As 
such, we would expect participation rates to be strictly decreasing in this threshold level.  Hence, 
as the required 
min b  grows sufficiently large, the relative importance of the consumption effect 
dwindles and donations will converge to those that would be elicited via a VCM.  This suggests a 
second proposition:   
Proposition 2. For agents with reciprocal preferences, imposing conditionality- i.e., 
requiring that 
min 0  bb  in order to receive a gift – leads to a decrease in average 
contributions.  However, conditionality may “crowd-in” donors through a consumption 
effect and thus has an ambiguous effect on participation rates.  Further increases in 
min b  
serve to crowd out donors but has an ambiguous effect on average contribution levels. 
 
Proposition 2 highlights that the overall effect of changing 
min b  depends on the trade-off between 
two effects – the crowding of reciprocity and increased contributions by those who pool at 
min b  
to “purchase” the gift.
8 
Net contributions to the charity  
Since the provision of gifts is costly to the charity, the use of conditional gifts may prove 
a profit maximizing strategy for a charity in both the short- and long-runs.  In the short-run, 
conditional gifts provide a way for the charity to screen donors and avoid entering into a gift-
relationship with types for whom such a strategy is a net loser.  In particular, the charity will 
want to avoid entering into a gift-exchange relationship with any agent for whom 
   
   
      1 0  
as such agents increase their contributions by less than the cost of the gift.  Hence, providing 
                                                 
8 Note that the latter effect is zero when moving from an unconditional gift to conditionality given by          0 . 
The net effect on contributions of introducing conditionality without a positive minimum contribution is therefore 
predicted to be negative. 10 
 
such types an unconditional gift guarantees net losses for the charity that could be reduced by 
introducing conditionality to the gift-exchange relationship.   
Further, by manipulating 
min b the charity can increase contributions from any agent for 
whom the consumption effect applies – i.e., those who contribute exactly 
min b  in order to 
“purchase” the gift.  However, there is a cost of conditionality – increasing 
min b  crowds out 
participation and contributions from reciprocal types for whom 
opt CG min (1, , )   i bg b .  Which of 
these effects dominates in the short-run is ex ante unknown and will depend upon the realization 
of key model parameters.   
In the long-run, the relative superiority of a particular form of gift exchange depends 
crucially on the persistence of reciprocity and the proportion of reciprocal types in the 
population.  As noted above, unconditional gifts maximize the number of donors.  As previous 
givers are more likely to contribute and provide larger average gifts than other donor types 
(Landry et al., 2010), it is thus plausible to intuit conditions under which unconditional gifts 
prove a superior fund-raising strategy in the long-run. 
Yet, such conditions require that feelings of reciprocity, as triggered by the receipt of a 
gift in a prior fund-raising campaign, persist and influence behavior in subsequent fund-raising 
efforts.  If not, our model predicts that those initially attracted via conditional gifts should be 
more likely to give and provide larger average donations.  As conditionally serves to crowd 
reciprocity, reciprocal agents who contributed any given amount in a conditional gift treatment 
implicitly revealed a higher value for the public good than a counterpart contributing this same 
amount in an unconditional gift treatment.  If feelings of reciprocity are fleeting, we would 
therefore expect donors initially attracted via conditional gifts to be weakly more loyal to the 
charity than counterparts who initially received the same gift unconditionally. 11 
 
That such possibility exists highlights a heretofore “hidden benefit” of control that arises 
as conditionality provides an effective technology for screening donors.  Yet, such benefits are 
“hidden” in the sense that they would escape one’s attention if reasoning were based upon the 
standard approach of using a static model and assuming that all donors are reciprocal.  In such 
models, there is no benefit to screening donors and conditionality can only have negative 
impacts.  However, as our model highlights, there are many reasons why a profit maximizing 
charity could benefit from screening donors. 
III.  Experiment I – Design and Results 
To examine the main conjectures of our theory, we designed a door-to-door fund-raising 
natural field experiment.  The experimental treatments are guided by our theory, and are meant 
to provide a test of its predictions.  We make use of seven different treatments, composed of a 
VCM baseline and gift variants that include small and large gifts provided both conditionally and 
unconditionally.   
A.  Experimental Treatments 
In each of the seven treatments, households in predetermined neighborhood blocks in Pitt 
County, North Carolina were approached by a paid solicitor and asked if they would like to make 
a contribution to support the Center for Natural Hazards Research at East Carolina University.
9  
Households that answered the door were provided an informational brochure detailing the 
activities of the Hazard Center since its inception in 2004 and read a fixed script that outlined the 
reason for the solicitors’ visit.  The script included a brief introduction that informed the resident 
                                                 
9 The neighborhood blocks were selected to provide a representative sample of three distinct household types: (i) 
households that contributed to the Hazards Center in a previous fund-raising effort, (ii) households that were visited 
in previous fund-raising efforts but elected not to contribute, and (iii) households that did not speak to a solicitor in a 
previous fund-raising drive.  A companion paper (Landry et al., 2010) explores these variations in more detail.  For 
our purposes, we simply include controls for these different household types. 12 
 
of who the solicitors were, the purpose of their visit, a two-sentence summary of the non-profit 
organization, and when applicable a description of the gift (see the Appendix).   
Our first two variations from the baseline VCM treatment are unconditional small and 
large gift treatments.  For the small gift, we used an attractive bookmark with the Hazard Center 
or East Carolina University logo.  For the large gift, we used a copy of the New York Times 
bestseller Freakonomics.  In the small (large) unconditional gift treatment, we simply added the 
following to the baseline script: 
As a token of our appreciation, we would like you to have this bookmark (copy of 
Freakonomics) as a gift to you.  The bookmark (book) is yours to keep whether or 
not you make a donation. 
 
These treatments permit a test of whether unconditional gifts enhance both the extensive and 
intensive margins, and whether the magnitude of such effects are related to gift size.   
  To operationalize exogenous changes in the perceived generosity of the gift we introduce 
a conditionality variant to these gift treatments by inserting the following passage in the baseline 
script:  
As a token of our appreciation, we will give you this bookmark (copy of 
Freakonomics) as a gift should you make a donation today. 
 
This treatment eliminates the agent’s most opportune action—taking the gift and giving nothing.  
As such, this manipulation should change the perceived generosity of the gift compared to the 
unconditional case 
CG UG    .   
  Our final two treatments further restrict the action set by adding a price point to the 
unconditional gift: 
As a token of our appreciation, we will give you this bookmark (copy of 
Freakonomics) as a gift should you make a donation of $1 ($25) today. 
 13 
 
Our price points were chosen to approximate the current retail price of the two goods.  While 
these two treatments serve to follow our theory, the chosen price in the small gift treatment 
serves to present a particularly demanding test of theory.  First, most donors likely will view any 
“restrictions” on actions as illusory since every contribution in our previous fund-raising drive 
for the Hazard Center (Landry et al., 2006) was $1 or more.  Second, the psychology literature 
teaches us that even solicitees who would like to contribute are largely unaware of the level of an 
acceptable donation, and therefore might refrain from giving merely because they want to avoid 
the social embarrassment of giving too little.
10     
  An extension of this second line of reasoning provides an important reason why these 
treatments also present a particularly demanding test of our theory for the large gift treatment.  
Literature in psychology provides some empirical evidence that mention of a target donation 
amount serves to increase the response rate (see, e.g., Fraser et al., 1988; Briers et al., 2007).  In 
this spirit, simply providing a goal of $25 might serve to increase the number of donors.
11   
  Table 1 summarizes the design of experiment I.  The experimental treatments were 
conducted between April 21
st and June 24
th, 2006 with six sessions conducted between 9am and 
5pm on Saturday and another five sessions conducted on Wednesday and Thursday evenings 
between 5pm and 8pm.  Our design resulted in a sample size of 4283 total households 
approached – 878 in the VCM, 768 in the unconditional small gift (USG), 610 in the 
unconditional large gift (ULG), 634 in the no price point conditional small gift (CSG-NPP), 380 
in the price point conditional small gift (CSG-PP), 481 in the no price point conditional large gift 
                                                 
10 While outside of our theory, this intuition has some empirical support.  For instance, Cialdini and Schroeder 
(1976) found that in a door-to-door charity drive including the quip “even a penny will help” considerably increased 
the number of donations without adversely affecting the average contribution. 
11 For further information about the actual exchange of information, we direct the reader to the Appendix, which 
contains a copy of the informational brochure and script. 14 
 
(CLG-NPP), and 532 in the price point conditional large gift (CLG-PP) treatment.  Of the 
households approached, 1381 answered the door and spoke to a solicitor. 
B.  Recruiting and Training of Solicitors 
  As Table 1 reveals, we employed a within-solicitor design using a total of thirty-six 
unique solicitors.  Of the thirty-six total solicitors, nineteen participated in the VCM treatment, 
nineteen participated in the unconditional small gift treatment, twenty-two participated in the 
conditional small gift treatment, thirteen participated in the unconditional large gift treatment, 
and seventeen participated in conditional large gift treatment.
12   To control for possible order 
effects, solicitors were randomly assigned to treatments, and we were careful to run multiple 
treatments on every day of the experiment.   
  Each solicitor’s experience typically followed four steps: (1) consideration of an 
invitation to work as a paid employee of the Center, (2) an in-person interview, (3) a training 
session, and (4) participation as a solicitor in the campaign.
13  Undergraduate solicitors were 
recruited from the student body at ECU via flyers posted around campus, announcements on a 
university electronic bulletin board, advertisements in the local campus newspaper, and direct 
appeal to students during undergraduate economics courses.  All potential solicitors were told 
that they would be paid $10 per hour during training and employment and would be expected to 
work multiple days.  Interested solicitors were instructed to contact the Economics Department 
to schedule an interview. 
  Before proceeding to the results section, we should highlight a few important design 
issues.  First, every applicant was offered employment as a solicitor after completing an in-
                                                 
12 Six of the solicitors only participated in a single treatment.  Of the remaining thirty solicitors, sixteen participated 
in two different treatments and fourteen participated in three or more different treatments.  No single solicitor 
participated in all seven treatments.   
13 See Landry et al. (2006) for further details on recruitment; we followed their study in this regard.   15 
 
person interview.  Second, the training sessions were conducted by the same researcher and 
provided the solicitor with background information on the Hazard Center and a review of the 
solicitation script and data collection procedures.  Third, each solicitor wore an identification 
badge that included his or her picture, name, and city solicitation permit number.  Fourth, we 
randomly allocated solicitors across neighborhoods and treatment type, and solicitors remained 
in the same treatment throughout each given day.  Finally, after every interaction with a 
household, each solicitor filled out data collection forms that included the amount donated along 
with demographic data such as the estimated age, gender, and race of the potential contributor. 
C.  Experimental Findings 
Table 2 summarizes donor behavior, as well as solicitor and household characteristics 
across treatment.  For example, our solicitors approached 878 households in the VCM treatment 
and elicited contributions from 21.3 percent (61 out of 286) of those who answered the door.  
The average donation amount was $1.90 per solicitation; therefore, we raised $541.35 in the 
VCM treatment.  In total we raised approximately $3333 (~$2.40 per solicitation) for the Hazard 
Center.  Further scrutiny of the data leads to our first set of results on unconditional gifts: 
Result 1a: Unconditional large gifts enhance both the extensive and intensive 
margins.  
Result 1b: The size of the unconditional gift importantly influences donor behavior. 
 
These first two results are consonant with our theoretical model and share similarity with the 
findings reported in Falk (2007), who explored the importance of gift exchange in a mail 
solicitation fund-raiser.  Moreover, these results call into question “pure” altruism as a driver of 
donor behavior.  Under the “pure altruism” model, ulterior motives – i.e., reciprocity – should 
have no impact on donor behavior as the receipt of unconditional gifts is delinked from the 
contribution decision.     16 
 
Casual evidence for these two results is contained in Table 2.  First, we find that in the 
raw data, neither the propensity to contribute (22% vs. 21.3%) nor the average contributions 
($1.73 vs. $1.90) are significantly different across the unconditional small gift treatment and the 
baseline VCM treatment.  Yet, we find that both figures are considerably larger in the 
unconditional large gift treatment:  nearly twice as many solicitees contribute (36.8% vs. 21.3%), 
and give more than twice as much on average ($4.48 vs. $1.90).  Both of these results are 
statistically significant at conventional levels (p < .05) using both a parametric matched pairs t-
test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
 14  
  To complement these unconditional insights, we estimate a series of linear regression 
models that explicitly control for observable and unobservable differences across solicitors.  This 
analysis is important because such factors might systematically differ across treatment, leading 
to erroneous inference from a simple analysis of the raw data.  Specifically, we estimate a linear 
regression model of the amount contributed for each household that answered the door 
(including zero contributions) on dummy variables for our experimental treatments and other 
covariates: 
ij ij ij ij X Z L        ,                  (4) 
where Lij is the contribution level of the j
th household to the i
th solicitor, Z is a vector of treatment 
group status indicators, and X is a vector of other covariates – including observable 
characteristics of potential donors.  To account for unobservable heterogeneities at the solicitor 
level, we include solicitor fixed effects.
15 
                                                 
14 The unit of observation in each of these tests is solicitor specific averages for a particular treatment.  The test 
statistic is thus based on the distribution of the difference in these solicitor specific averages between the 
unconditional large (small) gift treatment and the baseline VCM.  Using such matched pairs tests controls for 
potential solicitor specific dependencies across treatments.      
15 Qualitative insights are similar if we use a Tobit specification or if we estimate equations (4) and (5) with a 
standard two-stage selection equation with the yes-no contribution decision modeled in the first stage and the dollars 17 
 
  Empirical estimates presented in Model A of Table 3 provide insights consistent with the 
unconditional results:  households contributed approximately $2.66 more in the unconditional 
large gift treatment than in the baseline VCM treatment, with this difference statistically 
significant at the p < 0.05 level.  Further insights garnered from Table 3 suggest that donors 
respond to the perceived value of a gift as predicted by our theoretical model.  On average, 
households contributed approximately $2.60 more when receiving a copy of Freakonomics 
rather than a bookmark, with this difference significant at the p < 0.05 level.  Empirical results 
are qualitatively consistent across richer models that account for more of the variation in the data 
(see Models B and C in Table 3). 
To gain insights into the factors that influence the decision of households to contribute to 
the Hazard Center, we estimate a linear probability model of the contribution decision of 
households that answered the door: 
ij ij ij ij e X Z C      ,               (5) 
where Cij equals unity if solicitor i received a contribution for household j, and equals zero 
otherwise.  We again include solicitor fixed effects and three model types, which all paint a 
similar picture.
  
  Empirical estimates are presented in Model A of Table 4, and again indicate that gifts, as 
well as their size, matters.  For example, we find that households were more likely to contribute 
when approached by a solicitor in one of our gift treatments:  households are approximately 23 
percent (10 percent) more likely to contribute in the unconditional large (small) gift treatment.  
Interestingly, both of these estimates are significantly different from zero, suggesting that the 
small gift has some import on the extensive margin.  Yet, the approximate 13 percent difference 
                                                                                                                                                             
contributed in the second.  Also, all reported empirical results are robust to models that augment X to include 
additional household controls such as donor age and previous contributions to the Hazards Center. 18 
 
in contribution rates across the unconditional large and small gift treatments is significant at the 
p < 0.05 level.  
Turning to the effects of our conditional gift treatments, we report a second set of results: 
Result 2a:  Providing donors with a conditional, rather than an unconditional, gift 
decreases participation rates and average donations per contact. 
 
Result 2b:  Both rates of giving and average donations per contact are lower when we 
increase control and require a $25 donation to obtain the large gift.  
 
Result 2c:  Conditionality induces an increased propensity for donors to pool at the 
minimum donation level required to receive the gift.  
  
Evidence for Results 2a and 2b can be found in Tables 2-4.  For example, summary results in 
Table 2 show that both average contributions per contact and participation rates are reduced 
when we move from the unconditional large gift treatment to a conditional large gift treatment.  
Participation rates (average contributions) in our no price point treatment are approximately 4.6 
percent ($2.20) lower than those observed when donors are provided the large gift 
unconditionally.  Interestingly, we observe no such crowding out in our small gift treatments, 
perhaps suggesting that the bookmark is unable to generate feelings of reciprocity.   
  To complement these insights, we return to the empirical estimates in Tables 3 and 4 
which control for unobserved heterogeneity across solicitors in a fixed effects regression model.  
Model A of Table 3 shows that average donations per contact are approximately $1.64 ($2.06) 
lower in the conditional no price point (conditional price point) large gift treatment than in the 
analogous unconditional large gift treatment, with both of these differences significant at the p < 
0.05 level.  This former difference is consonant with Proposition 2 which predicts a net reduction 
in average contributions when moving from an unconditional gift treatment to a conditional gift 
treatment requiring a minimum donation of b > b
min = 0 to receive the gift.  Further, that we find 19 
 
an inverse relationship between b
min and average donations suggests that crowding dominates 
consumption effects in our setting.     
Considering average participation rates, we observe that households are less likely to 
contribute to the Hazard Center when offered a large gift conditionally.  As noted in Model A of  
Table 4, a household is approximately 2 percent (18 percent) less likely to contribute when 
receiving the large gift, conditioned upon making a donation of any amount ($25) to the Hazard 
Center.  While this former difference is not significant at any meaningful level, the difference in 
participation rates between the CLG price point treatment and both the ULG and CLG no price 
point treatments is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.  Empirical results for the small 
gift treatment highlight that the extensive margin is considerably enhanced by providing social 
cover for low donations.  This result accords with Cialdini and Schroeder (1976) and the broad 
literature, mostly in psychology and marketing, that has followed (for a review see, e.g., 
Brockner et. al., 1984; Fraser et al., 1998).   
  Evidence for Result 2c can be found in Figures 1 and 2, which show histograms of 
donations in our VCM and three small (large) gift treatments.  As illustrated in Figure 1, there is 
an increased propensity for agents to pool at the $1.00 contribution level in our price point 
treatment.  While approximately 2.04 percent of all households approached contribute $1.00 in 
our unconditional small gift treatment, the percentage of households approached that contribute 
this amount in the corresponding price point treatment increases to approximately 13 percent.  
Using a two-sample test of proportions, the more than six-fold increase is statistically significant 
at the p < 0.01 level.   
We observe similar data patterns in our large gift treatments.  As illustrated in Figure 2, 
the percentage of households approached that contribute $1.00 ($25.00) in our no price point 20 
 
(price point) treatments is greater than the corresponding percentage of households contributing 
these amounts in the analogous unconditional gift treatment.  While approximately 1.9 percent 
(2.4 percent) of all households contribute $1.00 ($25.00) in our unconditional large gift 
treatment, the respective percentage in the equivalent no price point (price point) treatment is 4.9 
percent (6.8 percent).  Using a two-sample test of proportions, we find that the former 3 
percentage point difference is statistically significant at the p < 0.10 and that the latter 4.4 
percentage point difference is significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
Our analysis has thus far concentrated on gross proceeds.  From the perspective of a 
charitable organization, it is clearly of interest to further examine net public good provision—
average contributions less the costs of purchasing the gifts.  In this regard, we present a final 
result: 
Result 3:  In the short-run, the VCM and the gift treatments that eliminate the agent’s 
most opportunistic actions maximize public good provision. 
 
Evidence for Result 3 is provided in the final panel of Table 2 – net public good provision per 
household in our large gift treatments is monotonically increasing in the level of conditionality.  
As noted in the table, gross proceeds in both our unconditional and no price point large gift 
treatments were insufficient to cover the costs of purchasing the copies of Freakonomics.  As 
such, net revenues per contact in these treatments are significantly lower than the $1.90 ($1.75) 
figure observed in our baseline VCM (price point large gift) treatment at the p < 0.05 level.  
Furthermore, the approximate $1.41 difference in net revenues per contact across our ULG and 
no price point treatments is statistically significant at the p < 0.10 level.  Interestingly, we 
observe no discernable difference in net revenues across our small gift treatments and the VCM, 
again highlighting that the bookmark may not induce feelings of reciprocity. 21 
 
  Exploring this result a level deeper, approximately 37.2 percent of all non-donors in our 
unconditional large gift treatment keep the copy of Freakonomics – generating losses in the 
range of $1.13 per household contacted.  Amongst the set of donors, approximately 69.2 percent 
(45 out of 65) of those who kept the copy of Freakonomics provided gifts less than the $12.98 
cost of obtaining the book.  For no price point large gift treatment, approximately 81.1 percent 
(30 out of 37) of all donors kept the book but provided donations less than this amount.  Taken 
jointly, these data suggest that there are a non-trivial number of types in the population for whom 
entering into a gift-exchange relationship is a losing proposition.  Hence, altering b
min to “screen” 
such types proves a profit enhancing strategy for the Hazard Center. 
 IV.  Experiment II – Design and Results 
  Results from experiment I highlight that in the short-run, the charity is better off 
providing gifts conditionally in order to screen insufficiently-reciprocal types for whom gift 
exchange is a net loser.  However, as conditional gifts serve to crowd out donors, it is not clear 
whether conditionality is an optimal strategy in the long-run.  As noted in Landry et al. (2010), 
previous givers to the Hazard Center are approximately 19 percent more likely to contribute in 
future campaigns and provide average gifts that are roughly twice as large as counterparts who 
have never given.  Given that households in our unconditional large gift treatment were 
approximately 74.4 percent more likely to give than counterparts approached in the 
corresponding price point treatment, it is thus plausible to intuit conditions under which 
unconditional gifts prove a superior fund-raising mechanism in the long-run.   
However, fundamental to any such story is the assumption that, once triggered, feelings 
of reciprocity influence behavior in subsequent fund-raising efforts.  Yet, whether and the extent 
to which feelings of reciprocity are sustained across campaigns is ex ante unknown.  As such, 22 
 
data from experiment I provides little insight regarding long-run dynamics and the relative 
superiority of conditional versus unconditional gifts.  To better ascertain long-run impacts, we 
return to the field and implement a second door-to-door fund-raising experiment during. 
A.  Experimental Design   
In designing the second field experiment, we made use of detailed information on 
whether and how households were previously approached.  Households in predetermined 
neighborhood blocks in Pitt County, North Carolina were approached by a paid solicitor and 
asked if they would like to make a contribution to support the Hazard Center using a simple ask 
strategy (or voluntary contribution mechanism).  The neighborhood blocks were selected to 
provide a representative sample of two distinct household types: (i) households that have never 
contributed to the Hazard Center (cold-list households), and (ii) households that were 
approached and contributed to the Hazard Center (warm-list households) in experiment I.  As 
small gifts (the bookmarks) had no discernable impact on outcomes in experiment I, we restrict 
the sample of warm-list households to those who were previous approached in either the VCM or 
one of the three large-gift treatments.     
As in experiment I, households that answered the door were provided an informational 
brochure detailing the activities of the Hazard Center and read a fixed script that outlined the 
reason for the solicitor’s visit.  The script included a brief introduction that informed the resident 
of the purpose of their visit and noted that all proceeds raised in the fundraising campaign would 
be used to fund research that benefits Pitt County and the surrounding area. 
Table 5 summarizes the design for experiment II.  Fund-raising efforts were initiated on 
September 12
th, 2009 and continued through the 16
th of that month.  We employed a total of 
fifty-five solicitors who worked three hour shifts starting between 9 to 10am on Saturday 23 
 
morning, 1 to 2pm on both Saturday and Sunday afternoon, and at 5pm on both Tuesday and 
Wednesday evenings.
16  Our design resulted in a sample size of 2772 total households 
approached.  Of the households approached, 1074 answered the door and spoke with a solicitor – 
833 who did not speak to a solicitor in experiment I, 62 drawn from the VCM treatment in 
experiment I, 65 drawn from the Unconditional Large Gift treatment in experiment I, and 114 
drawn from a Conditional Large Gift treatment in experiment I.
17  The solicitation approach 
mirrors the design of experiment I. 
B.  Experimental Findings 
  Table 6 presents summary statistics including information on the success of solicitors 
across different household types.  For example, as noted in the table, solicitors spoke with 62 
households who were approached in the VCM treatment in experiment I.  Of these, 
approximately 22.6 percent (or 14 of 62) contributed to the Hazard Center.  In total, our 
solicitors raised $1914.72 (or approximately $1.78 per solicitation) for the Hazard Center: 
$1532.72 (or $1.84 per solicitation) from households not solicited in experiment I, $103 (or 
$1.66 per solicitation) from households previously solicited using a VCM, $69 (or $1.06 per 
solicitation) from households previously solicited in the unconditional large gift treatments, and 
$210 (or $1.84 per solicitation) from households previously solicited in a conditional large gift 
treatment.
18   
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16 The recruiting and training of solicitors followed the same procedures as those used in experiment I.   
17 In analyzing the data from experiment II, we pool HH’s initially approached in the no price point and price point 
large gift treatments as participation rates and average contribution levels are indistinguishable across these two 
groups.   
18 The set of previously approached households includes both prior contributors to the Hazard Center and those who 
elected not to give in the prior fund-raising effort.   24 
 
  Table 6 summarizes donor behavior, as well as household characteristics across different 
household types.  As noted in the table, our solicitors elicited contributions from 14.3 percent (4 
of 28) of warm-list households initially attracted via an unconditional large gift.  In contrast, 
solicitors approaching a warm-list household initially attracted via a conditional large gift were 
approximately 151 percent more likely to elicit a contribution.  Importantly, this difference is 
significant at the p < 0.05 level using a two sample test of proportions.  We observe similar, 
albeit less pronounced, differences when comparing participation rates against those initially 
attracted via a simply ask for money (VCM).     
Exploring average contributions, we observe similar differences across the same 
household types.  The $1.29 average contribution from households initially attracted via an 
unconditional gift is approximately 63 percent (29.5 percent) lower than that elicited from 
counterparts initially attracted by a conditional large gift (VCM).  While the latter difference is 
not significant at meaningful levels, the former is significant at the p < 0.05 level using either a 
parametric t-test or non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  Taken jointly, these data suggest a 
fourth result:   
Result 4:  Donors initially attracted via unconditional gifts are less loyal to the cause 
than counterparts attracted by conditional gifts or a VCM. 
   
Importantly, Result 4 suggests that feelings of reciprocity – triggered by the receipt of an 
unconditional gift – are short-lived and have little impact on subsequent behavior.  Hence, while 
data from experiment I suggest the importance of gift exchange, results from experiment II 
highlight that the effects of gift exchange are contemporaneous and reciprocity is limited to the 
immediate source of kindness.       25 
 
  To complement these unconditional insights, we estimate a series of linear regression 
models that explicitly control for observable differences across households and unobservable 
differences across solicitors.  In this spirit, we estimate linear regression models of the amount 
contributed for each household that answered the door (including zero contributions) on dummy 
variables for our experimental treatments and other covariates: 
ij ij ij ij X Z L       ,                  (6) 
where Lij is the contribution level of the j
th household to the i
th solicitor, Z is a vector of treatment 
group status indicators, and X is a vector of other covariates – including observable 
characteristics of potential donors.  To account for unobservable heterogeneities at the solicitor 
level, we include solicitor fixed effects. 
Empirical estimates presented in Model A of Table 7 provide insights consistent with the 
raw data summary: donors initially attracted by an unconditional gift contribute approximately 
$2.28 less than counterparts initially attracted by a conditional gift – a difference that is 
statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.  Further insights garnered from Table 7 highlight 
that there is no discernable difference in the contributions of households initially attracted via an 
unconditional gift and those who originally gave in a VCM.
19  Empirical results are qualitatively 
consistent models B and C which include additional household level controls.   
To gain insights into the factors that influence the decision of households to contribute to 
the Hazard Center, we estimate a linear probability model of the contribution decision of 
households that answered the door: 
ij ij ij ij e X Z C      ,               (7) 
                                                 
19 Interestingly, our data suggest that the manner in which cold-list households – i.e., those who were approached 
but did not give in experiment I – were initially approached has no impact on future contribution levels.   26 
 
where Cij equals unity if solicitor i received a contribution for household j, and equals zero 
otherwise.  We again include solicitor fixed effects and three model types, which all paint a 
similar picture.   
For example, empirical estimates in Model A of Table 8 suggest that households initially 
attracted via an unconditional gift are approximately 79.5 percent less likely to contribute than 
counterparts initially attracted via a conditional large gift – a difference that is significant at the p 
< 0.05 level.  Similarly, such households are approximately 55.5 percent less likely to contribute 
than counterparts initially attracted via a VCM – a difference that is significant at the p < 0.10 
level.  Estimates for Models B and C provide similar insights and highlight that observable 
characteristics such as the race, gender and the age of potential donors influence participation 
rates. 
Viewed in conjunction with results from experiment I, our data therefore suggest that 
unconditional gifts are a bad investment for the Hazard Center.  In the short-run, the use of such 
gifts enhances participation rates and gross proceeds per contact.  However, the increased 
participation rates and average gifts come at a cost – approximately 23.4 percent of all 
households approached keep the gift but do not contribute to the Hazard Center.  In the long-run, 
donors attracted to the Hazard Center using unconditional gifts are less likely to contribute and 
provide lower average donations than counterparts attracted by other means.  Hence, the Hazard 
Center is unable to recover the short-run losses associated with the use of unconditional gifts and 
would have been better off relying upon other fund-raising strategies – i.e., simple asks for 
money or the provision of conditional gifts.    
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  Having explored the dynamics of unconditional gifts, we now examine the relative long-
run impact of conditional gifts vis-à-vis a simple ask strategy.  Results from experiment I 
highlight that in the short-run, there is no discernable difference across these treatments.  Hence, 
the charity is indifferent between the use of simple asks for money and providing donors a 
conditional gift.  Yet, as donors in the conditional gift treatment provide average contributions 
that are approximately 30 percent greater than counterparts initially approached in a VCM, it 
would be intuitive to posit that conditional gifts will have a greater impact on subsequent fund-
raising efforts. 
  Data from experiment II allow us to explore this conjecture and suggest a fifth result:         
Result 5:  Donors initially attracted via a conditional gift are more loyal to the cause 
than counterparts attracted via a VCM. 
 
To provide evidence for this result, consider the raw data summary in Table 6.  Warm-list 
households attracted through a conditional gift treatment are approximately 25.5 percent more 
likely to give (35.9 versus 28.6 percent) than counterparts initially approached in a VCM and 
provide average gifts that are approximately 90.7 percent greater ($3.49 versus $1.83) than such 
types – differences that are significant at the p < 0.10 and p < 0.05 levels respectively.   
  Additional support for Result 5 is contained in Tables 7 and 8 which condition 
participation rates and contribution levels on observable household characteristics and 
unobservable solicitor specific effects.  For example, as noted in Model A of Table 7, households 
initially attracted via a conditional gift provide average gifts that are approximately $2.28 (or 
186.9 percent) greater than counterparts initially attracted via a VCM – a difference that is 
significant at the p < 0.05 level.  Model A in Table 8, highlights similar differences in regards to 
participation rates:  donors initially attracted via a conditional gift are approximately 116.7 28 
 
percent more likely to contribute than a counterpart who originally gave in a VCM. Estimates 
from Models B and C of these tables provide qualitatively similar insights and highlight the 
robustness of this result to the inclusion of additional household level controls. 
  Combined with results from experiment I, our data therefore suggest that conditional gift 
exchange provides a superior fund-raising mechanism.  For academics, this result calls into 
question results from the laboratory suggesting that the use of explicit incentives – such as 
conditional rewards and punishment – entail considerable “hidden” costs (see, e.g., Fehr and 
Rockenbach, 2003; Fehr and List, 2004; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006).  Although we cannot rule out 
that some individuals respond adversely to conditional gifts, ‘control’ as defined in the literature 
provides a means for the Hazard Center to enhance the profitability of its fund-raising efforts.  In 
this regard, our data highlight a “hidden benefit” of control in that such mechanisms provide a 
way to screen donors – an effect that would escape our attention if reasoning had we followed 
the standard approach in the literature of using a static model and experimental design that 
measures short-run substitution effects.  For practitioners, this result highlights the benefits of 
using mechanisms such as conditional gifts that serve to screen insufficiently-reciprocal types 
and those with “low” intrinsic value for the charity.   
V.  Conclusions           
  A cornerstone of the recent ascension of behavioral economics is the study of the 
interaction of psychological and economic incentives.  This study takes this line of work to the 
field by making use of a series of field treatments that parallel some of the important economic 
features of the environments explored in the literature.  Our approach uses an actual capital 
campaign that raised thousands of dollars for the Center for Natural Hazards Research at East 29 
 
Carolina University.  Importantly, we use natural incentives to change exogenously the 
solicitees’ action space to test for hidden benefits or costs of control.   
Our results can be broken down into three main categories.  First, we report results that 
highlight why people give to charity and why they remain committed the cause.  In this manner, 
we find that the pure altruism model can be rejected, and that fundraising practitioners can 
effectively use gifts to enhance fundraising success.  Second, there are hidden benefits of control:  
fundraising success is enhanced when the most opportunistic donor choices are restricted.  This 
occurs not only because of short run benefits, but also because conditionality can be used as a 
screen of donor type.  Finally, we find considerable evidence of the efficacy of gift exchange in 
the field but note that the effects of gift exchange are purely contemporaneous.  This suggests 
that the static experimental designs that are meant to measure the effects of gift exchange 
provide a good approximation to the total effects. 
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Table 1:  Design – Experiment I 

































































 3  Solicitors 
198 Visit 
62 Home 










 3  Solicitors 
92 Visit 
28 Home 

























   5  Solicitors 
147 Visit 
43 Home 






 2  Solicitors 
51 Visit 
15 Home 






















    2  Solicitors 
85 Visit 
31 Home 
   2  Solicitors 
87 Visit 
18 Home 
Note:  Each cell represents one unique session in which we gathered data using one of the five treatments.  For example, row 1, column 1, denotes that session 
one of the VCM treatment employed six solicitors that approached a total of 168 houses, of which 69 answered the door.  All conditional gift treatments run 
during the month of June required a minimum donation of $1 ($25) to obtain a bookmark (copy of Freakonomics).   
 
* In this treatment the solicitors only worked 2 hours before quitting due to illness. 34 
 












Contribution Decisions       
All Data Pooled       
HH’s  Approached  878  768 1014 610 1013 
Total  HH’s  Home  286 245 337 209 304 
% of HH’s Donating  21.3%  22.0%  29.9%  36.8%  26.3% 
Average  Donation  $1.90 $1.73 $1.98 $4.48 $2.47 
Avg. Conditional Donation  $8.92  $7.86  $6.62  $12.15  $9.39 
% of Donors that Refuse Gift  .  20.4% 9.9% 15.6%  11.3% 
No Price Point Data Only       
HH’s Approached  .  .  634  .  481 
Total HH’s Home  .  .  199  .  143 
% of HH’s Donating  .  .  25.1%  .  32.2% 
Average Donation  .  .  $1.98  .  $2.28 
Avg. Conditional Donation  .  .  $7.88  .  $7.08 
% of Donors that Refuse Gift  .  .  18.0%  .  19.6% 
Price Point Data Only       
HH’s Approached  .  .  380  .  532 
Total HH’s Home  .  .  138  .  161 
% of HH’s Donating  .  .  36.9%  .  21.1% 
Average Donation  .  .  $1.98  .  $2.64 
Avg. Conditional Donation  .  .  $5.37  .  $12.51 
% of Donors that Refuse Gift  .  .  1.9%  .  0.0% 
Solicitor Characteristics       
Total Number of Solicitors  19  16  20  13  16 
% of White Male Solicitors  10.5%  18.75%  10%  15.4%  6.25% 
% of White Female Solicitors  42.1%  18.75%  55%  30.8%  43.75% 
% of Minority Male Solicitors  21.1%  31.25%  20%  30.8%  25% 
% of Minority Female Solicitors  26.3%  31.25%  15%  23%  25% 
No Price Point Data Only       
Total Number of Solicitors  .  .  11  .  7 
% of White Male Solicitors  .  .  9.1%  .  0.0% 
% of White Female Solicitors  .  .  45.5%  .  42.9% 
% of Minority Male Solicitors  .  .  27.2%  .  42.9% 
% of Minority Female Solicitors  .  .  18.2%  .  14.3% 
Price Point Data Only       
Total Number of Solicitors  .  .  10  .  11 
% of White Male Solicitors  .  .  10%  .  9.1% 
% of White Female Solicitors  .  .  70%  .  45.4% 
% of Minority Male Solicitors  .  .  10%  .  18.2% 
% of Minority Female Solicitors  .  .  10%  .  27.3% 
Household Characteristics       
% of White Males  45.4%  40.7% 45.1% 40.7% 40.8% 
% of White Females  51.0%  48.9% 42.4% 45.9% 48.7% 
% of Minority Males  2.4%  4.6%  4.2%  5.7%  5.9% 
% of Minority Females  1.0%  5.8%  8.3%  7.6%  4.6% 
 Estimated Average Age  44.1  45.0  43.5  42.9  41.0 35 
 
Public Good Provision       
Total Donations (All Data)  $541.35  $440.00  $651.43  $953.76  $746.00 
Number of Gifts Distributed  .  177  91  114  48 
% of HH’s that Refuse Gift  .  27.8%  9.9%  45.5%  11.3% 
% of Donors that Refuse Gift  .  20.4% 9.9% 15.6%  11.3% 
% of Non-Donors that Refuse  . 29.8% . 62.8% . 
Expenditure on Gifts  .  $17.70  $9.10  $1479.72  $623.04 
Net Contribution per HH  $1.90  $1.72  $1.91  -$2.52  $0.40 
Price Point Data Only       
Total Donations  .  .  $274.20  .  $425.00 
Number of Gifts Distributed  .  .  50  .  11 
Expenditure of Gifts  .  .  $5.00  .  $142.78 
Net Contribution per HH  .  .  $1.95  .  $1.75 
No Price Point Data Only       
Total Donations  .  .  $373.23  .  $321.00 
Number of Gifts Distributed  .  .  41  .  37 
Expenditure of Gifts  .  .  $4.10  .  $480.26 
Net Contribution per HH  .  .  $1.85  .  -$1.11 
 
Note:  Figures in the table represent summary statistics across the different treatments. 
 
a  There were two solicitors in the USG treatment that worked a single day and were unable to elicit any 
contributions.  If we exclude the 30 households visited by these solicitors the percentage of households contributing 
in the USG treatment increases to 25.1% and the average donation per contact increases to $1.97.   36 
 
Table 3:  Average Donation per Household – Fixed Effects Regression Models 
























































HH Age 30 or Under      -1.10** 
(0.55) 
HH Age 65 or Over      -0.93** 
(0.42) 
     






Observations  1381 1381 1381 
R-Squared  0.02 0.02 0.03 
 
** Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
 
Note: Cell entries provide parameter estimates for a fixed effects linear regression model of contribution levels 
(including the zeroes) for our experiment.  Cell entries can be read as follows – average contribution levels in the 
ULG treatment (column 1, row 4) are approximately $2.66 greater than those for our baseline VCM treatment.   37 
 
Table 4:  Probability of Contributing – Fixed Effects Regression Model 
























































HH Age 30 or Under      -0.03 
(0.04) 
HH Age 65 or Over      -0.04 
(0.03) 
      






Observations 1381  1381  1381 
R-Squared 0.02  0.02  0.03 
 
** Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
* Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
 
Note:  Cell entries provide parameter estimates for an fixed effects model estimating the dichotomous decision of 
whether or not a household made a contribution to the Hazard Center.  Cell entries can be read as follows – agents in 
the ULG treatment (column 1, row 4) are 23 percent more likely on average to contribute to the Hazard Center than 







Table 5: Design – Experiment II 
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Table 6:  Summary Statistics – Experiment II 






Not Solicited in 
Experiment I 
All Data Pooled      
Total HH’s Home  62  65  114  833 
% of HH’s Donating  22.6%  12.3%  18.4%  21.2% 


















Previous Givers Only      
Total HH’s Home  35  28  39   
% of HH’s Donating  28.6%  14.3%  35.9%   























Previous Non-Givers      
Total HH’s Home  27  37  75   
% of HH’s Donating  14.8%  10.8%  9.33%   
















Household Characteristics      
% of White Males  45.2%  46.2%  44.7%  45.3% 
% of White Females  48.4%  38.5%  45.6%  40.5% 
% of Minority Males  1.6%  4.6%  5.3%  5.2% 
% of Minority Females  3.2%  9.2%  4.4%  7.1% 
 Estimated Average Age  49  42.9  40  44.6 
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Table 7:  Average Donation per Household – Fixed Effects Regression Models 



































Prior Non-Donor from an 







Prior Non-Donor from a 















White Male Solicitee      0.94** 
(0.19) 
White Female Solicitee      1.16** 
(0.39) 
Minority Female Solicitee      1.19* 
(0.69) 
     
Solicitor Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
# of Observations  1074  1074  1074 
R-Squared  0.01 0.01 0.04 
** Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.05 level 
* Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.10 level 
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Table 8:  Participation Rates – Fixed Effects Regression Models 



































Prior Non-Donor from an 







Prior Non-Donor from a 















White Male Solicitee      0.04** 
(0.02) 
White Female Solicitee      0.07** 
(0.03) 
Minority Female Solicitee      0.12** 
(0.05) 
     
Solicitor Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
# of Observations  1074  1074  1074 
R-Squared  0.01 0.01 0.02 
** Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.05 level 
* Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.10 level 
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Figure 1:  The Frequency of Donations – Small Gift Treatments 
 




























































Appendix  – Solicitation Scripts and Informational Brochure 
 
ECU Center for Natural Hazards Research – Baseline Script 
 
(If a minor answers the door, please ask to speak to a parent. Never enter a house.) 
 
- Hi, my name is _____________________. I am an ECU student visiting Pitt County 
households today on behalf of the ECU Center for Natural Hazards Research.  
 
(Hand the person at the door a copy of our newsletter.) 
 
- The Hazard Center provides support and coordination for research on natural hazard risks, 
such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and flooding.   
 
- Our newsletter describes recent research initiatives in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, and the 
Center’s mission. 
 
- The primary goal of the center is to reduce the loss of life and property damages due to 
severe weather events.  
 
- We are collecting contributions today on behalf of the ECU Hazards Center.  
 
- The Center is a non-profit organization and these funds will be used to conduct research 
that benefits Pitt County and the surrounding area. 
 
- Would you like to make a contribution today? 
 
(If you receive a contribution, please write a receipt that includes their name and contribution 
amount. If the resident asks, contributions are tax deductible). 
 
- If you have questions regarding the Center or want additional information, visit the web site 
listed in the newsletter.  
 
Thank you. 44 
 
ECU Center for Natural Hazards Research- Informational Brochure 
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